India’s ‘Act East’ policy

  India’s ‘Act East’ policy is a diplomatic initiative to promote economic, strategic and cultural relations with the vast Asia-Pacific region at different levels.

“The objective of the ‘Act East’ policy is to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and develop strategic relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the States of the Northeastern Region including Arunachal Pradesh with other countries in our neighbourhood (emphasis added)”.

Example :Commerce, Culture and Connectivity are the three pillars of India’s robust engagement with ASEAN

India’s AEP had to factor in:

a. The development of its Northeast to reap the benefits of linking with eastern economic success models (while tackling insurgencies)
b. its relationship with some of its closest regional strategic partners like Vietnam
c. its strategic/economic interests with the major powers including the USA and China but also Japan and Australia
d. its approach to the emerging regional security architecture and the regional economic architecture (especially RCEP) e. the contours of its maritime policy which would factor in our immediate Indian Ocean strategic interests without neglecting the Pacific.

Challenges to Act East Policy  to India :

•  First, while India’s opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and boycott of Beijing’s flagship BRI forum in May 2017 may have signaled resolve to ASEAN, it makes little economic sense to exclude oneself from a massive infrastructure and connectivity enterprise in which numerous ASEAN states are implicated. Going forward, therefore, India’s economic and political priorities may increasingly come into conflict.
• Second, by deepening defence cooperation in the South china sea ,in future maritime controversy or conflict between Beijing and one or more ASEAN nations. At that point, low-level adventurism (on both sides) might very well turn out to have major consequences that India cannot deter or see through due to insufficient naval capabilities for sustained operations outside the Indian Ocean.  Without this capability, India’s support to ASEAN countries in a potential crisis will be nothing more than rhetorical and quickly discredited.
• Third within ASEAN is likely to complicate , to build closer economic and security ties with the latter. Countries such as Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar in particular, given their low levels of development compared to other ASEAN members, have proved susceptible to Chinese inducements and pressure (Vietnam, while less developed, has sought to diversify partnerships and resist Chinese influence).
• Singapore are occasionally thrown into uncertainty by unexpected rockiness in their relations with China. Thus, while ASEAN may well speak with one voice to India, its tone will be modulated by Beijing’s maneuverings relative to individual member states, particularly as the BRI unfolds across the region.

https://youtu.be/JKd9y_Klz9M

https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33523/Lecture_by_External_Affairs_Minister_on_Act_East_Policy_and_IndiaJapan_cooperation_in_North_East_India_with_a_special_focus_on_Assam